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Environmental decision support intends to use the best available scientiﬁc knowledge to help decision
makers ﬁnd and evaluate management alternatives. The goal of this process is to achieve the best
fulﬁllment of societal objectives. This requires a careful analysis of (i) how scientiﬁc knowledge can be
represented and quantiﬁed, (ii) how societal preferences can be described and elicited, and (iii) how
these concepts can best be used to support communication with authorities, politicians, and the public in
environmental management. The goal of this paper is to discuss key requirements for a conceptual
framework to address these issues and to suggest how these can best be met. We argue that a combi-
nation of probability theory and scenario planning with multi-attribute utility theory fulﬁlls these re-
quirements, and discuss adaptations and extensions of these theories to improve their application for
supporting environmental decision making. With respect to (i) we suggest the use of intersubjective
probabilities, if required extended to imprecise probabilities, to describe the current state of scientiﬁc
knowledge. To address (ii), we emphasize the importance of value functions, in addition to utilities, to
support decisions under risk. We discuss the need for testing “non-standard” value aggregation tech-
niques, the usefulness of ﬂexibility of value functions regarding attribute data availability, the elicitation
of value functions for sub-objectives from experts, and the consideration of uncertainty in value and
utility elicitation. With respect to (iii), we outline a well-structured procedure for transparent environ-
mental decision support that is based on a clear separation of scientiﬁc prediction and societal valuation.
We illustrate aspects of the suggested methodology by its application to river management in general
and with a small, didactical case study on spatial river rehabilitation prioritization.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Two main problems make decisions in environmental man-
agement difﬁcult (McDaniels et al., 1999; Kiker et al., 2005; Clemen
and Reilly, 2013). First, the society consists of individuals with a
high diversity of perspectives, opinions, and interests. This makes it
impossible to formulate “societal objectives” in any strict sense.
Societal objectives may be deﬁned as objectives with which a
majority of people would agree. Still, such objectives may be con-
ﬂicting and they are difﬁcult to formulate and quantify. Second,
environmental or coupled socio-environmental systems are com-
plex. Therefore, it is difﬁcult to reliably predict the consequences of
decision alternatives. However, as the desirability of alternatives
depends on the degree to which their consequences fulﬁll theEcology and Inland Fisheries
r Ltd. This is an open access articleobjectives, it is very important to derive such predictions and
consider their uncertainty in decision making.
To account for these difﬁculties, different decision support
techniques have been suggested and applied in environmental
management (Salminen et al., 1998; Lahdelma et al., 2000; Kiker
et al., 2005; Mendoza and Martins, 2006; Mahmoud et al., 2009;
Huang et al., 2011; Gregory et al., 2012; Linkov and Moberg,
2012). All of them structure the decision making process into
procedural steps and assess the degree by which decision alter-
natives fulﬁll the objectives. Some techniques rely on qualitative
assessments, while others quantify preferences and predictions
and rank alternatives based on scores of the expected fulﬁllment of
objectives.
Important elements contributing to the success of environ-
mental decision support are: transparency of the procedure, a good
representation of stakeholders, the willingness of stakeholders to
participate constructively and make their objectives explicit,
guidance by a good facilitator, and a good conceptual basis of the
underlyingmethodology (Howard, 1988; Belton and Stewart, 2001;under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ments explains, why decision support in environmental manage-
ment can be successful for different underlying approaches
(Hajkowicz, 2008). An excellent facilitator, for instance, may
compensate for a poorer conceptual basis, or uncooperative
stakeholders may hinder the success even if a conceptually sound
procedure is used.
Thus, a good conceptual basis of the decision support method-
ology is only one important element that contributes to success. It
is particularly relevant to support the use of scientiﬁc knowledge in
societal decisionmaking that has to be justiﬁed to the public. This is
a key element of environmental management. Important concep-
tual requirements of good environmental management decision
support can thus be summarized as follows:
1. Use of a mathematical formalism to describe scientiﬁc knowl-
edge that
a) can deal with uncertainty (to consider poor predictability),
b) is able to represent conditional knowledge (for given driving
forces, future scenarios, or decision alternatives),
c) can consistently describe a learning process based on new
data (consistent means here that learning in two steps with
partial data leads to the same result as learning in one step
with all data).
2. Use of a mathematical description of preferences that
a) imposes as few constraints as possible to allow large freedom
for specifying individual preferences,
b) considers risk attitudes to account for uncertainty in pre-
dictions in addition to describing preferences for certain
outcomes,
c) avoids unreasonable results, such as rank reversals of top
scoring alternatives if inferior alternatives are added or
removed.
3. Use of a structuring and quantiﬁcation process that
a) is relatively easy to understand and supports transparent
communication of the reasons for a decision to the public,
b) supports identifying causes of disagreement and separates
scientiﬁc predictions from societal valuations,
c) stimulates the generation of better alternatives and supports
including them without re-elicitation of preferences.
As argued previously, procedures that violate some of these
criteria can still lead to a successful decision support. However, we
are convinced that a generally recommendable technique for
bringing scientiﬁc knowledge into environmental management
must be defendable against criticism. How can we convince
stakeholders, if the chosen technique can lead to strange results
that do not reﬂect common sense?
In the following, we ﬁrst discuss which choices of methodolo-
gies these requirements imply. For each of these choices, we sug-
gest modiﬁcations to established procedures to better adapt them
for environmental management. In Sections 2 and 3, we do this for
the mathematical representation of scientiﬁc knowledge and of
societal preferences, respectively. Then, in Section 4, we discuss
how these concepts can be applied in practice and explain key as-
pects of their use for river management. In Section 5, we illustrate
the suggested procedure more concretely with a small, didactical
case study on spatial prioritization for river rehabilitation. Finally,
we summarize our conclusions in Section 6.
2. Representing and acquiring scientiﬁc knowledge
It is reasonable to base environmental management on the best
available scientiﬁc knowledge. Scientiﬁc knowledge is always
incomplete, dispersed in the scientiﬁc community, and it is difﬁcultto identify the most relevant knowledge for a given decision. To
support the transparent use of scientiﬁc knowledge, it is crucial to
think about how to represent it mathematically, how to acquire it,
and how to use it to get scientiﬁc predictions that optimally support
environmental management (Reichert, 2012).
2.1. Representing scientiﬁc knowledge
2.1.1. Philosophical interpretations of probability
The history of scientiﬁc reasoning is closely related to the
mathematical framework of probability. The correct interpretation
of probabilities as a philosophical basis of (natural) science (see
Hajek, 2012 and references therein) has been much more inten-
sively discussed than any of the suggested alternative concepts. In
our brief outline of different interpretations of probability we
roughly follow Gillies (2000), particularly concerning the historic
development (see Chalmers, 1999 for a broader coverage of the
philosophy of science).
The most important distinction is between objective and
epistemic interpretations of probability. Objective interpretations
use probabilities to describe features of the material world that are
independent of humans, whereas epistemic interpretations use
probabilities to quantify human knowledge or belief.
Important objective interpretations are the frequency and pro-
pensity interpretations. The frequency interpretation (e.g. Von
Mises, 1928) deﬁnes probability as the limit of relative fre-
quencies of events in a repeatable experiment. It assumes under-
lying physical laws that guarantee that this limit exists. The
propensity theory (Popper, 1959; see also Gillies, 2000) intends to
make objective probabilities applicable to single events by
emphasizing the circumstances or causes of a single event that
could in principle make it repeatable.
In contrast, epistemic interpretations use the same mathemat-
ical construct of probability to describe degrees of belief of in-
dividuals. The logical theory (e.g. Keynes, 1921) assumes that
different individuals will independently come to the same degree
of belief given the same evidence. Doubts about the possibility to
uniquely derive probability statements based on logical reasoning
lead to the development of the subjective interpretation of proba-
bility (e.g. Ramsay, 1926; De Finetti, 1931). Here, probabilities
describe degrees of belief of individuals. Such probabilities can be
different for different individuals facing the same evidence.
In the subjective interpretation, probabilities are operational-
ized by lotteries about which an individual is indifferent. Assume a
lottery provides a gain proportional to (1  p) for a statement to be
true and a loss proportional to p otherwise. If an individual is
indifferent between this lottery and the lottery with the reverse
outcomes, then his or her belief that the statement is true is deﬁned
to be p. It can be shown that if an individual agrees to operationalize
his or her beliefs in this sense and wants to avoid sure loss if
someone makes a choice among lotteries the individual is indif-
ferent, then these quantities, p, must be probabilities in the sense of
fulﬁlling the axioms of probability theory (see Howson and Urbach,
1989 for a careful discussion and proof of this RamseyeDe Finetty
theorem).
There are other, complementary arguments for using probabil-
ities to describe subjective beliefs. Cox (1946) shows that condi-
tional beliefs that fulﬁll minor requirements must follow the laws
of probability theory. Lindley (1982) proves that any scoring rule to
quantify uncertainty that fulﬁlls some reasonable properties can be
transformed to probabilities. The argument of Cox is particularly
important for environmental management since we are often
confronted with questions as “which are the expected conse-
quences, given a management alternative or future scenario?” This
requires specifying conditional beliefs. Interestingly, several,
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to describe subjective beliefs.
Finally, Gillies (1991) introduced the intersubjective interpreta-
tion of probability by extending the RamseyeDe Finetti argument
to groups of individuals sharing a common interest. He advocates a
pluralist view of probability that uses different interpretations in
different contexts (Gillies, 2000). He suggests to use epistemic
probabilities in the social sciences and objective, propensity-based
probabilities in the natural sciences.
2.1.2. Ideal representation of scientiﬁc knowledge by intersubjective
probabilities
We agree with Gillies (2000) on the need of a pluralist view of
probability with different interpretations in different contexts. The
subjective interpretation is important when describing individual
beliefs and human behavior, whereas objective interpretations are
fundamental to the natural sciences. To support environmental
decision making, we need a description of the best available sci-
entiﬁc knowledge. This knowledge is usually not perfect enough
that intrinsic randomness, characterized by objective probabilities,
is the only source of uncertainty. Therefore, ideally, we would like
to describe the best available scientiﬁc knowledge by intersubjec-
tive probabilities about which the scientiﬁc community agrees.
As it is impossible to ask all scientists, reasonable approxima-
tions are probability distributions about which several experts
agree, or which are constructed from the individual beliefs of
different experts. When constructing intersubjective knowledge
from beliefs of different experts, the individual beliefs become
“observations” of the current state of knowledge. To minimize the
“observation error”, the individual beliefs can be averaged.
Such an intersubjective interpretation conforms to standards of
best scientiﬁc practice, such as the peer-review system of scientiﬁc
journals, by which articles are only accepted upon positive
assessment by several independent experts (Bornmann and Daniel,
2010). It also agrees with practices of knowledge integration in
modeling as represented particularly clearly by Bayesian belief
network modeling (e.g. Borsuk et al., 2004).
Given this agreement with current scientiﬁc standards, it is
surprising that a discussion of the conceptual basis of intersub-
jective probabilities is largely missing in the scientiﬁc literature
(but see Gillies, 2000; Rowbottom, 2008). Although usually not
discussed explicitly, the research ﬁeld of combining expert opinions
(Clemen and Winkler, 1999) also builds implicitly on an intersub-
jective interpretation of probability (see also Section 2.2.2).
Another important argument for using intersubjective proba-
bilities to describe scientiﬁc knowledge is rarely discussed. Uncer-
tainty of the outcome of a perfectly known system affected by
randomness can be characterized by objective probabilities. Once
the random event is realized, but the outcome has not yet been
observed, uncertainty becomes epistemic. Here, the underlying
objective probability serves as the natural, intersubjective charac-
terization of the epistemic uncertainty of the outcome (it seems
reasonable to believe with a probability of 1/6 of each possible
outcome of a dice that has been thrown but not yet observed, as this
is the underlying objective probability before the dice was thrown).
This adoption of objective probabilities as intersubjective,
epistemic knowledge is only possible if the same mathematical
framework is used to quantify randomness (with objective proba-
bilities) and uncertain knowledge (with intersubjective, epistemic
probabilities).
A ﬁnal argument for using the probabilistic framework to
describe knowledge is that Bayesian inference provides a consistent
description of an iterative learning process: updating prior infor-
mation iteratively with partial data leads to the same result as
updating once with all data.2.1.3. Considering imprecision
Intersubjective probability distributions, representing scientiﬁc
knowledge, can be based on consensus within a group of scientists
or by aggregating their individual beliefs.
In practice, scientists may be uncertain about their own beliefs
and a group may not reach consensus. Therefore, we may have to
account for the scientists' ambiguity about the current state of
knowledge. A conservative way of considering uncertain knowl-
edge is to ask experts for intervals of provided probabilities or
quantiles instead of precise estimates (Meyer and Booker, 2001;
O'Hagan et al., 2006). Alternatively, intervals can be constructed
from the replies of different experts. For continuous variables, this
information can be used to construct sets of probability distribu-
tions instead of a single, precise distribution. Such sets are also
known as imprecise probabilities (Walley,1991; Rinderknecht et al.,
2012b; http://www.sipta.org). When used as prior distributions in
Bayesian inference, this leads to so-called robust Bayesian analysis
(Berger, 1984, 1994; Pericchi and Walley, 1991; Rinderknecht et al.,
2014). The density-ratio class (DeRobertis and Hartigan, 1981;
Berger, 1990) is particularly interesting, as it is invariant under
updating, marginalization, and propagation through a determin-
istic model (Wasserman, 1992; Rinderknecht et al., 2014).
2.1.4. Combination with scenarios
In some cases, due to a too high degree of ambiguity, scientists
may even hesitate to formulate predictions as imprecise probabil-
ities. Here, alternative future scenarios may be developed, often for
driving forces or external inﬂuence factors (Schoemaker, 1995;
Ringland, 2006). If external inﬂuence factors are formulated as
scenarios, probabilistic predictions for the system of interest can be
formulated conditional on these scenarios. This combines future
scenario and probabilistic prediction approaches (Lienert et al.,
2014; Scholten et al., 2014a,b).
2.1.5. Alternative theories for describing uncertain knowledge
The use of probability theory as the most adequate framework
for describing epistemic uncertainty has been challenged (Helton
and Oberkampf, 2004; Colyvan, 2008). The main criticism is that
typically insufﬁcient knowledge is available to specify a precise
probability distribution. Alternative approaches to consider this
ambiguity (Helton et al., 2004) are evidence theory (Dempster,
1967; Shafer, 1976), possibility theory (Zadeh, 1978; Dubois and
Prade, 1988; Dubois, 2006), and interval analysis (Moore, 1979).
Similar to imprecise probabilities, evidence theory uses lower and
upper probabilities, but evidence is combined by different rules
(Dempster, 1967). Possibility theory is based on fuzzy sets, where
potential elements have a “degree of membership” between 0 and
1. 0 indicates not to be an element, 1 to be an element. Values in
between formulate partial degrees of membership. Membership
functions seem to be similar to probability densities, but they use a
different normalization and a different calculus. Interval analysis
characterizes unknown quantities by intervals without specifying
probability distributions within the intervals. These intervals are
then propagated through functions allowing for all possible com-
binations of values in the intervals. This theory is particularly
important for exact maximum error analysis of digital computers.
In our view, none of these alternative theories has a similarly
good axiomatic foundation as probability theory for ideally repre-
senting uncertain scientiﬁc knowledge. However, the argument
that ambiguity about the correct probability distribution can hardly
be represented by probabilities (Colyvan, 2008) is justiﬁed. For this
reason we suggest the use of intersubjective probabilities to
describe scientiﬁc knowledge in the absence of signiﬁcant ambi-
guity (see Section 2.1.2), and imprecise, intersubjective probabili-
ties otherwise (see Section 2.1.3). This approach can easily be
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2.2. Acquiring scientiﬁc knowledge
Integrating scientiﬁc knowledge for environmental decision
support can best be done by experts in the respective ﬁelds. Such
integrated, intersubjective knowledge can be gained by eliciting
consensus probability distributions of a group of experts (in the
sense of Gillies, 1991, 2000) or by constructing an aggregated
probability distribution from subjective distributions of individual
experts (extending intersubjective probabilities as introduced by
Gillies, 1991, 2000; see Section 2.1.2). Below, we comment on elic-
itation and aggregation procedures.
2.2.1. Eliciting knowledge as probability distributions
There exist standard procedures for eliciting subjective beliefs of
individuals as probability distributions (e.g. Morgan and Henrion,
1990; Meyer and Booker, 2001; O'Hagan et al., 2006). Continuous
distributions are usually elicited by asking the expert(s) for selected
quantiles or cumulative probabilities and then ﬁtting a parametric
distribution through the elicited points. Known biases of proba-
bility elicitation should be avoided by carefully designed elicitation
protocols (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kynn, 2008). Recently,
these techniques have been extended to elicit imprecise probability
distributions as density-ratio classes (Rinderknecht et al., 2012a).
2.2.2. Aggregating subjective probability distributions of experts
Many techniques for combining probability distributions to
aggregate expert opinions have been proposed (Winkler, 1968;
French, 1985; Genest and Zidek, 1986; Clemen, 1989; Clemen and
Winkler, 1999). We suggest to use the linear opinion pool (Stone,
1961), which calculates the weighted average of individual distri-
butions. There are the following reasons for this choice: It has
reasonable properties for the combination of information from
multiple experts (compromise between disagreeing opinions, but
no narrowing of the distribution if experts agree), it supports
transparency as it is easy to understand, and there is empirical
evidence that simple aggregation techniques are successful
(Clemen, 1989). Weights can be used to quantify different degrees
of expertise of different experts. This approach accounts for the fact
that the scientiﬁc uncertainty does not decrease with asking more
experts, but the conﬁdence in its correct description increases.
Considering ambiguity by imprecise probabilities offers new
perspectives for aggregating subjective probability distributions.
Quantiles or cumulative probabilities stated by experts can be used
to construct quantile or cumulative probability intervals, either by
including all stated values or by using a quantile interval that ex-
cludes extreme views. Then, a set of probability distributions can be
constructed that is compatible with these intervals analogously to
Section 2.2.1. Note that this is a conservative approach that may
lead to very high uncertainty in predictions.
2.3. How to get scientiﬁc predictions?
To support decisions in environmental management, we need
probabilistic predictions of the outcomes for management alter-
natives and scenarios of driving forces. We can thus either a) ac-
quire conditional predictions of the outcomes for all management
alternatives and driving force scenarios directly, or b) acquire
mechanistic knowledge on the structure and function of the
affected systems to derive predictions through modeling.
Approach b) is more universal as outcomes for new alternatives
can be predicted without re-elicitation. However, developing
mechanistic models requires a considerable effort. For generic
problems for which themodel can be re-used or can even become apermanent management tool, this is certainly preferable. Approach
a) can be implemented more quickly; it corresponds to acquiring
expert advice in a traditional sense, but it emphasizes the predic-
tion of outcomes rather than the selection among alternatives. In
practice, the approaches are often combined. Option b) is used for
predicting the consequences for those sub-systems for which
models are available or can be developed efﬁciently and option a)
for the other sub-systems.
Whenever possible, probability distributions elicited from ex-
perts should be updated by Bayesian inference with new, often
local data. This can narrow the distributions or lead to the identi-
ﬁcation of prior-data conﬂicts that have to be resolved.
2.4. Summary of arguments in favor of the suggested approach
In summary, the following arguments favor using (possibly
imprecise) intersubjective probabilities gained from experts to
describe the current state of scientiﬁc knowledge:
1. Despite good reasons for the existence of objective probabilities
in the real world, the incomplete state of scientiﬁc knowledge
can only be described by intersubjective beliefs. This is
compatible with established techniques of scientiﬁc quality
control, such as peer review.
2. Operationalization of (inter-)subjective beliefs based on indif-
ference between lotteries clariﬁes their meaning (as far as
possible). The rationality argument of avoiding sure loss sup-
ports the use of probabilities for describing uncertain knowl-
edge and becomes even stronger when formulating justiﬁable,
intersubjective knowledge rather than subjective beliefs. Other
reasons for this choice are based on assumptions regarding
conditional beliefs, the formulation of scoring rules, compati-
bility with objective probabilities, and the existence of a
consistent updating technique. According to these arguments,
intersubjective beliefs would ideally be described by
probabilities.
3. The extension to imprecision allows us to consider ambiguity
induced by uncertain knowledge of experts or disagreeing
opinions. In case of negligible ambiguity, imprecise probabilities
degenerate to precise ones that we argued for in the ideal case.
4. The suggested approach can easily be combined with future
scenarios of external inﬂuence factors. This is done by using
conditional probability distributions based on the scenarios.
Thus, the description of the current state of scientiﬁc knowledge
by potentially imprecise, intersubjective probabilities fulﬁlls re-
quirements 1a, 1b and 1c formulated in the introduction. Alterna-
tive approaches are built on a weaker conceptual basis and do not
seem to compensate this with other advantages.
3. Describing societal preferences
In addition to acquiring the best scientiﬁc knowledge for pre-
dicting the outcomes of decision alternatives, we need a repre-
sentation of societal preferences to support environmental decision
making. We can then evaluate to which degree the predicted out-
comes of management alternatives fulﬁll the societal goals. Even
more importantly, the insights gained through this process can
stimulate the generation of better alternatives. We adopt the
framework of value-focused thinking (Keeney, 1992), which em-
phasizes thinking about what one would like to achieve and being
open for any kind of measures to reach this goal rather than
focusing on given alternatives.
The ﬁrst difﬁculty of quantifying societal goals is that “societal
preferences” are even harder to tackle than individual preferences.
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think hard about the problem and often preferences become more
concrete during the elicitation process (Belton and Stewart, 2001).
This problem is aggravated when preferences have to be formu-
lated by laypersons, who are unfamiliar with environmental sys-
tems and their management. Additionally, because of the
heterogeneity of people and their interests and perceptions, “so-
cietal preferences” do not exist in a strict sense. Therefore, we are
searching for a description of preferences either of multiple, less
heterogeneous (stakeholder) groups or of a representative, large
sample of the population. The ﬁrst type of preferences can show the
plurality among groups and resulting differences can stimulate the
process of ﬁnding “compromise” alternatives (Hostmann et al.,
2005a). The second type may help to check whether an alterna-
tive could reach acceptance in a public vote. The same mathemat-
ical formalism can and should be used for both cases, but elicitation
techniques may differ. In the ﬁrst case, face-to-face interviews can
be performedwith a (relatively small) number of representatives of
the groups. Here, it may even be possible to address technical or
scientiﬁc issues related to the decision problem. In the second case,
simpler, possibly online surveys of a larger set of persons are
required. These can only cover objectives at a relatively general
level and have to rely on summary assessments at lower levels. In
both cases, we are interested in intersubjective preferences that are
representative of the (stakeholder) group or the whole society.
3.1. Conceptual basis for representing preferences in multi-attribute
value and utility theories (MAVT/MAUT)
Decisions in environmental management have to be commu-
nicated and justiﬁed to the public. This is facilitated by trans-
parently conveying objectives and rational arguments of how these
can best be achieved. This is the core of decision analysis or the
theory of rational decision making (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976;
Keeney, 1982; Eisenführ et al., 2010) which is built on relatively
simple rationality axioms.
The concepts of rational decision making are often violated in
actual human decision making. Alternative models have been
suggested to better account for human behavior (Simon,1955,1956,
1982; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier,
2011). Nevertheless, to structure the decision making process and
to justify public decisions, rational arguments are important as they
make the decision transparent and plausible. Thus, despite the
deﬁciencies of rational decision theory as a behavioral theory, it is
still preferable to behavioral theories when applied to support
justiﬁable decision making in environmental management.
Following the concept of value-focused thinking (Keeney, 1982),
it is crucial to start decision support by discussing which objectives
should be achieved. Hereby, the overall objective is hierarchically
broken down into sub-objectives each of which is more focused
and concrete and all together cover all important aspects of the
objective at the higher level. Then, the degree of fulﬁllment of the
objectives must be quantiﬁed, as a function of observable proper-
ties, so-called attributes, y¼ (y1,…,yn), of the system affected by the
decision. If we assume that the preferences of a decision maker or
stakeholder over outcomes are complete and transitive, then an
ordinal value function, v(y), exists that has larger values for
preferred alternatives (there are minor additional technical re-
quirements; see Keeney and Raiffa, 1976 or Eisenführ et al., 2010
and literature cited therein). Complete preferences means that for
any pair of outcomes the decision maker or stakeholder can decide
which one he or she prefers, or whether he or she is indifferent
between the two outcomes. Transitivity requires that if someone
prefers an outcome y(a) over an outcome y(b) and y(b) over y(c), then
he or she prefers y(a) over y(c). An ordinal value function is uniqueup to a strictly increasing (possibly nonlinear) transformation. It
can be scaled to the interval [0,1], where 0 represents the worst and
1 the best outcome. As mentioned above, these assumptions are
hardly questioned as a basis for a procedure to guide rational de-
cision making for decisions that have to be justﬁed to the public,
although they are sometimes violated by actual human behavior.
More information about the preferences of the decisionmaker or
stakeholder can be included in two ways: First, as we are also
interested in quantifyingpreferences regarding transitions fromone
state to another, we assume that these are also complete and tran-
sitive. Under these assumptions a measurable (or cardinal) value
function exists for which larger differences between values of out-
comes imply stronger differences in preference (e.g. Keeney and
Raiffa, 1976 or Eisenführ et al., 2010). A measurable value function
is unique up to a linear, increasing transformation. It can thus be
made unique by specifying the value for the worst outcome under
consideration as 0 and the best outcome as 1. This is the basis of
multi-attribute value theory (MAVT). The secondoption is to include
information about risk attitudes of the decision maker or stake-
holder. This leads to a utility function (note that in economics the
term “utility function” is oftenused forwhat in decision analysis and
in this paper is called “value function”). In this case, probabilistic
outcomes can be ranked according to their expected utility. The
axioms of expected utility theory, also called multi-attribute utility
theory (MAUT), were ﬁrst derived by Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947) (see e.g. Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). A utility
function can be directly elicited as a function of attributes by asking
for relative preferences between lotteries of outcomes (see e.g.
KeeneyandRaiffa,1976 or Eisenführ et al., 2010). Alternatively, it can
be expressed as a function of value after having ﬁrst elicited a value
function (Dyer and Sarin, 1982). The latter option has the advantage
of providing preference and risk attitude information separately.
Moreover, it minimizes the need for eliciting preferences between
lotteries, as this is only needed for the overall value instead of the
values of each sub-objective (see Section 3.2).
The few axioms of MAVT, essentially completeness and transi-
tivity, will hardly be questioned as guiding principles for rationally
evaluating alternatives and justifying decision to the public. Utili-
ties, the axioms of which may be more difﬁcult to communicate
and agree with, will often not change the results. This can be tested
by sensitivity analysis (see Sections 3.2 and 4.4 and Schuwirth et al.,
2012). As there are no further constraints or rules for the formu-
lation of preferences, MAVT/MAUT is based on a minimal set of
assumptions and leaves the decision maker or stakeholder as much
freedom as possible for formulating his or her beliefs.
3.2. Implementation of MAVT and MAUT
To implement the description of societal preferences as value
and utility functions, we need to construct these functions based on
interviews with decision makers or stakeholders, or based on
population surveys. We distinguish preference elicitation based on
objectives hierarchies and preference construction using discrete
choice experiments. The ﬁrst technique is better suited to obtain
preference information from a small group of people, whereas the
second is better suited to survey the population. As utility functions
confound preferences and risk attitudes, and value functions are
easier to elicit, we prefer eliciting value functions and transfer them
to utilities later (Dyer and Sarin, 1982).
3.2.1. Preference elicitation based on objectives hierarchies
When eliciting preferences with interviews, it is recommend-
able to ﬁrst elicit an objectives hierarchy, then construct a value
function based on this hierarchy, and ﬁnally convert the overall
value into a utility.
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breaking down each objective into a set of mutually complemen-
tary and collectively comprehensive sub-objectives (Keeney and
Raiffa, 1976; Eisenführ et al., 2010). This helps to clarify what one
would like to achieve.
Constructing a value function is complex, because value judg-
ments are difﬁcult and because the overall value may depend on
many attributes. The structure offered by an objectives hierarchy
considerably simpliﬁes the construction of a multi-attribute value
function.
First, for the lowest level sub-objectives, adequate attributes
must be chosen that can be used to quantify the degree of fulﬁll-
ment of each objective as a measurable value function. As the
lowest level sub-objectives are relatively narrow in scope, one or a
few attributes may be sufﬁcient for each of these sub-objectives.
There are established techniques for eliciting such value functions
(see e.g. Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Eisenführ et al., 2010).
The next elicitation step requires constructing value functions
for objectives that combine lower level sub-objectives. Such a value
function is formulated as an aggregation function of the values at
the lower level, and it thus depends only indirectly on the attri-
butes. The top row of Fig. 1 shows examples of aggregation func-
tions of two values, v1 and v2: additive aggregation (weighted
arithmetic mean) with equal (Fig. 1A) and unequal (Fig. 1B) weights
given to the two sub-objectives, geometric aggregation (weighted
geometric mean) with equal weights (Fig. 1C), and mixed additive-
minimum aggregation (Fig. 1D) with equal weights (see Langhans
et al., 2014a for a more thorough discussion of value aggregation
techniques).
Elicitation of the correct aggregation function and its parame-
ters should be done by trade-off questions. This is illustrated in the
bottom rowof Fig.1 for the same aggregation functions as in the top
row. The horizontal and vertical line segments starting from nine
value combinations indicate the change in the value on the corre-
sponding axis required to get a gain in the aggregated value of 0.05.Fig. 1. Iso-value lines and color-coding of additive (for different weights), geometric, and m
aggregation techniques (bottom row). Horizontal and vertical lines indicate the change in the
See text for more explanations (modiﬁed from Langhans et al., 2014a).For additive aggregation with equal weights, the same increments
in v1 and v2 are required to reach outcomes between which the
decision maker or stakeholder is indifferent (Fig. 1E). These in-
crements are independent of the values v1 and v2 (the shape re-
mains the same when moving from the trade-offs marked in red to
those in green or blue). Different weights lead to different in-
crements in v1 and v2 (Fig. 1F), but they still do not depend on v1
and v2. Although in many studies such an additive aggregation
technique is assumed, this assumption should be tested carefully by
eliciting trade-offs for different values of v1 and v2. As an example,
geometric aggregation and mixed additive-minimum aggregation
lead to the dependence of the trade-offs on v1 and v2 (Fig. 1G and
H). When eliciting such trade-offs, the values v1 and v2 must be
communicated by associated attributes, because the attributes
characterize the state of the system and the value function is just a
tool to represent the preferences mathematically.
Trade-offs are best elicited by keeping one of the endpoints of
the lines in Fig. 1EeH ﬁxed and asking for the attributes corre-
sponding to indifference along the other line. Instead of asking for
this/these attribute(s), discrete choices of the attributes could be
given and the decision maker would be asked for preferences of
these given, discrete choices. This could be used for bracketing the
attributes for which the decision maker would be indifferent to the
reference state. To aggregate more than two values, this elicitation
step can be done by either keeping some values ﬁxed or by asking
for indifference between two states differing in multiple values.
As a last step, the value function of the overall objective must be
converted to a utility function to derive a unique ranking also for
uncertain outcomes (Dyer and Sarin, 1982). This can be done by
applying standard techniques, such as the certainty equivalent
method with a representation of the values by corresponding at-
tributes (e.g. Eisenführ et al., 2010). It may be worth checking for an
effect on the resulting ranking of alternatives beforehand by a
sensitivity analysis within a range of plausible risk attitudes.
Changes in the ranking only occur if the expected utilities of twoixed additive-minimum aggregation techniques (top row), and trade-offs for the same
value on the corresponding axis required to get a gain in the aggregated value by 0.05.
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signiﬁcantly different. If this sensitivity analysis indicates no rank
reversals, this last elicitation step can be omitted. A conversion
from values to utilities can also be done at lower levels. In this case,
different risk attitudes can be present in different branches of the
objectives hierarchy. This is still compatible with a single risk
attitude at the ﬁnal level of aggregation, but the aggregation rules
for values and utilities must fulﬁll consistency requirements.
3.2.2. Construction of preference representations using discrete
choice experiments
An alternative to the hierarchical construction of value functions
is the ﬁt of a parameterized value function to results of discrete
choice experiments (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1989). Typical statis-
tical techniques applied for such a ﬁt from discrete data are logistic
and probit regression (Agresti 2012). To apply these techniques,
many discrete choices are required. Therefore, these techniques are
particularly well-suited to construct a societal value function that
describes “average” preferences of the whole population, which is
represented by a large, representative sample of people. These
techniques are also applied to extract monetary trade-offs for cost-
beneﬁt analysis in environmental economics (see also Section 3.3).
3.3. Alternative approaches
Many alternative approaches to value and utility functions for
supporting rational decision making have been developed (see e.g.
Belton and Stewart 2001). Frequently applied techniques in envi-
ronmental management are outranking techniques, such as ELEC-
TRE (Roy, 1991; Figueira et al., 2013) and PROMETHEE (Brans et al.,
1986; Klauer et al., 2006; Behzadian et al., 2010), and the Analytic
Hierarchy Process, AHP (Saaty, 1977; Saaty, 1994). Despite many
successful applications, we prefer MAVT/MAUT because of the
following conceptual deﬁciencies of the other techniques: (i) the
potential for rank reversals when removing a lower ranked alter-
native (Wang and Triantaphyllou, 2008; Mareschal et al., 2008;
Dyer, 1990), (ii) the use of “ad hoc” aggregation schemes that
were not elicited from the decision maker or stakeholder, and (iii)
the difﬁculty of considering uncertainty and risk attitudes. Even if
these deﬁciencies can be addressed, MAVT/MAUT provides the
broadest coverage of potential preferences so that the other tech-
niques are not needed.
Cost-beneﬁt analysis is another methodology often applied in
environmental decision support (Hanley and Spash, 1993; Brouwer
and Pearce, 2005; Pearce et al., 2006). It is based on similar prin-
ciples as MAVT; in particular, discrete choice experiments are often
used to extract willingness to pay for ecosystem services (see also
Section 3.2.2). To keep them feasible, such discrete choice experi-
ments usually have to be limited to high levels of the objectives
hierarchy. This makes them suitable for analyses at the societal
level (as discussed in Section 3.2.2 for MAVT/MAUT), but does not
make it possible to consider details of the underlying mechanisms.
With a higher resolution of the objectives hierarchy, MAVT/MAUT
can provide a more detailed view on complex, multi-faceted deci-
sion problems (Chee, 2004) while still also providing the overview
at the highest levels.
3.4. Summary of arguments in favor of the suggested approach
In summary, the following arguments favor the use of value and
utility functions for the representation of societal preferences:
1. MAVT/MAUT is based on a small number of axioms that deﬁne
“rational choice”. Although individuals often violate these ax-
ioms in their personal decisions, these axioms make sense tosupport decisions which have to be justiﬁed transparently and
with rational arguments to the public.
2. Value functions are very ﬂexible regarding the representation
of preferences. In contrast to other decision support method-
ologies, there are hardly any formal constraints to quantifying
preferences.
3. The representation of preferences under uncertainty by utilities
makes it possible to consider risk attitudes of decision makers
or stakeholders in a consistent framework that ﬁts to the
probabilistic description we chose in Section 2 for representing
scientiﬁc knowledge. Formulating utilities as functions of values
facilitates elicitation and makes it possible to test the sensitivity
of the results to risk attitudes. If the resulting rankings are
insensitive to a reasonable range of risk attitudes, utilities are
not needed.
4. The elicitation of value and utility functions is (largely) inde-
pendent of the outcomes of speciﬁc alternatives. This makes
it possible to evaluate new alternatives without re-eliciting
preferences, except if it is necessary to extend the attribute
ranges.
5. The framework of MAVT/MAUT avoids artefacts such as rank
reversals when adding or removing alternatives or the use of ad-
hoc procedures for evaluating results.
Thus, the description of societal preferences by value and utility
functions fulﬁlls the requirements 2a, 2b and 2c formulated in the
introduction.
4. Making the theory accessible for practical decision support
Satisfying concepts for representing scientiﬁc knowledge and
societal preferences, as developed in the Sections 2 and 3, respec-
tively, are an important basis of good decision support. However,
successful implementation additionally requires that the concepts
are understandable to the decision makers and stakeholders and
that the decision support process is well structured andmoderated.
In this section, we discuss how the practical application of the
concepts discussed in the Sections 2 and 3 can be facilitated.
To make the discussion more concrete, we illustrate the key
elements with the example of river management. Many of the el-
ements discussed above have been applied to decision support
regarding different aspects of surface water management. Exam-
ples are river rehabilitation (Reichert et al., 2007; Beechie et al.,
2008; Corsair et al., 2009; Convertino et al., 2013), environmental
ﬂow requirements (Richter et al., 2003, 2006), ﬁsheries manage-
ment (McDaniels, 1995), and lake water quality management
(Anderson et al., 2001).
4.1. Structuring the decision making process
The most important element to support practical application of
the techniques outlined in Sections 2 and 3 is their embedding into
a structured decision making process (Gregory et al., 2012). Fig. 2
shows the key elements of such a process.
The decision making process starts with a clear deﬁnition of the
problem (step 1 in Fig. 2) and an analysis of stakeholders (Grimble
andWellard, 1997; Lienert et al., 2013) to be included in the process
(step 2). This is followed by the explicit formulation and structuring
of the objectives to be achieved (step 3), including the identiﬁcation
of observable system properties (attributes) that can be used to
quantify the degree of fulﬁllment of the objectives and the ranges of
these attributes. Next, the preferences regarding these objectives
can be elicited quantitatively in the form of a value function as
outlined in Section 3 (step 3). This value function can then be
confronted with observations of the attributes of the system to be
8. Analysis of results,
search for better alternatives
7. Evaluation of alternatives
based on expected degree
of achievement of objectives
3. Formulation, structuring and
quantification of objectives
1. Problem definition
2. Stakeholder analysis
4. Identification of deficits
5. Construction of alternatives
6. Prediction of consequences
Fig. 2. Structure of the decision making process (modiﬁed from Schuwirth et al., 2012).
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identify deﬁcits (step 4). This deﬁcit analysis can inspire the crea-
tion of management alternatives which improve the fulﬁllment of
the objectives (step 5). Depending on the nature of the alternatives,
it may often be a purely natural scientiﬁc or engineering problem to
predict the consequences of the alternatives (step 6). However,
some alternatives, such as establishing incentive systems to change
the behavior of social actors, may need predictions for social sys-
tems (this may require using behavioral decision theories). Con-
fronting the predictions with the quantiﬁed preferences leads to an
evaluation of the alternatives (step 7). In the most detailed execu-
tion of this decision making process (see Section 4.2), this step
consists of ranking the alternatives according to decreasing ex-
pected utility. The insights into the decision problem gained
through this process will often help to design better alternatives
(step 8, solid arrow) or lead to a revision of the objectives and/or
even of the problem deﬁnition and involved stakeholders (dashed
arrows).
While the order of the steps (Fig. 2) bears internal logic, the
beneﬁt of a structured decision making process largely results
from interactions among them. Therefore, the diagram is intended
to guide an iterative decision support process. Depending on the
application, detailed processing of some steps may be skipped in a
ﬁrst iteration and be taken up later. For example, if deﬁcits are
apparent and some measures are already suggested, it may be
useful to proceed to the prediction of their consequences (step 6)
before quantifying preferences in step 3. The ranges of predicted
attributes may then be useful when returning to step 3 to quantify
the preferences and an a priori sensitivity analysis regardingdifferent preference parameters may help to distribute the elici-
tation effort to the most important parameters (see also the
alternative ﬂow diagrams in Schuwirth et al., 2012; Lienert et al.,
2014).
4.2. Choice of appropriate application level
The required degree of detail for environmental decision sup-
port and the availability of resources vary considerably between
decision problems. The procedure outlined in Section 4.1 can guide
decision support at different levels of detail regarding the imple-
mentation of the steps shown in Fig. 2:
A. The steps of the procedure (Fig. 2) can be used to structure the
discussion among stakeholders and decision makers and stim-
ulate value-focused thinking (Keeney, 1992) without quantifying
objectives and predictions (Gregory et al., 2012).
B. Objectives hierarchies and the fulﬁllment of sub-objectives for
different alternatives can be assessed with stakeholders, deci-
sion makers, and experts without formally quantifying pre-
dictions and valuations.
C. Value functions can be constructed and applied to observed
attributes for deﬁcit analysis. Expert predictions can be used to
assess the improvement expected from different alternatives.
D. Utility functions can be applied to probabilistic predictions of
the consequences of decision alternatives obtained through
expert elicitation and/or mathematical modeling.
It is important that needs and resources are carefully consid-
ered to ﬁnd the appropriate degree of detail for decision support
in any speciﬁc case. Moreover, the sample of stakeholders or of the
population to elicit the preferences from and the elicitation
techniques depend on the application. To gain insight into the
decision problem and ﬁnd better alternatives, it may be useful to
elicit separate value function from representatives of different
stakeholder groups (Hostmann et al., 2005a,b; Lienert et al., 2011).
The effect of the diversity of opinions on ﬁnal rankings of alter-
natives can be analyzed, and causes of poor rankings may be
eliminated by modiﬁed alternatives. Alternatively, for a better
overview of the valuation by the society, the ﬁt of a parameterized
value function through the results of a discrete choice experiment
performed with a representative population sample may be more
suitable.
4.3. Structuring objectives and quantifying preferences
Carefully thinking about objectives and structuring them hier-
archically is a crucial step of any decision support procedure (Fig. 2,
step 3). The resulting objectives hierarchy can be used to facilitate
the quantiﬁcation of preferences (Fig. 2, step 3; see Section 3.2.1).
Here, we outline some elements of these steps for which we sug-
gest to deviate from standard decision analysis practice when
applying it to environmental management. We illustrate these
steps with an example from river management.
4.3.1. Generating and structuring objectives
Fig. 3 shows the upper levels of an objectives hierarchy for a
good river management strategy. At the highest level, the decision
maker or stakeholder has to weigh the objectives of a good
ecological state of the river network, good ecosystem services, low
costs, conformity with regulation, and a robust design of the al-
ternatives that allows for corrections. In this example, only “direct”
services are listed under ecosystem services. The objective of
achieving a good ecological state of the river network is kept as a
separate branch of the hierarchy and is not included in the
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Fig. 3. Example of an objectives hierarchy for a good river management strategy (modiﬁed from Reichert et al., 2011).
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ventional ecological river assessment procedures into a generic
value function for the good ecological state (see also Section 4.3.2).
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state of a river section (modiﬁed from Reichert et al., 2011).
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Representing preferences through value functions requires a
demanding elicitation procedure either by interviews, group dis-
cussions, or surveys (see Section 3.2). This process cannot be per-
formed easily for a large objectives hierarchy with many attributes.
An additional difﬁculty can be that some branches of the objectives
hierarchy require technical knowledge for their assessment. To
address both of these problems, the value functions for some
branches of the objectives hierarchy may be elicited from experts,
and used as input to the societal value function at higher levels of
the objectives hierarchy. In many cases, such branches can even be
formulated generically for a given type of assessed systems. Typi-
cally, the highest level of the hierarchy, representing the major
societal trade-offs, will remain case-speciﬁc and must be elicited
from stakeholders or a sample of the population.
In river management, existing ecological river assessment pro-
cedures developed generically with experts (Bundi et al., 2000;
Hering et al., 2004, 2006) can be translated into value functions
of the good ecological state of a river section (Fig. 4; Langhans et al.,
2013). Such value functions can then be used as branches of the
value function for river management, constructed on the basis of an
objectives hierarchy as shown in Fig. 3. The value function elements
corresponding to the higher hierarchical level will have to be eli-
cited from stakeholders.
The sub-objectives of reaching a good ecological state of a river
network (Fig. 3) consist primarily of assessing spatial conﬁgura-
tions of reaches in a good state. Not much research has been done
so far at this level of assessment (Bernhardt and Palmer, 2011);
most existing approaches are in systematic conservation planning
(Margules and Pressey, 2000; Linke et al., 2008, 2011; Er€os et al.,
2011). Besides the goal of having as many river sections in a good
state (leftmost sub-objective in Fig. 3), we formulate the objectives
of having the natural potential for ﬁsh migration and a high con-
nectivity of habitats in a good ecological state. The last of these
objectives is targeted towards other organisms than ﬁsh, particu-
larly invertebrates and riparian ﬂora and fauna which have
different dispersal requirements (see e.g. Tonkin et al., 2014). See
Section 5 for an example of how these criteria can be applied.
4.3.3. Making value functions redundant and ﬂexible
According to decision analysis textbooks (Keeney and Raiffa,
1976; Keeney, 1982; Eisenführ et al., 2010), objective hierarchies
should divide objectives at each hierarchical level into comple-
mentary sub-objectives that cover all relevant aspects of the higher-
level objective. This requirement excludes redundancy of sub-
objectives. Contrarily, we argue in favor of allowing redundancy of
sub-objectives and corresponding value functions in the context of
environmental management. The concept is to divide an objective
into (partly) redundant sub-objectives, adopt additive aggregation,
and allow for an evaluation of the higher-level value, irrespective of
how many values at the lower level are available (through a re-
normalization of the weights of the available values at the lower
level). Themain advantages are that the statistical signiﬁcance of the
result increases if redundant data are available, but that some
missing data within a redundant branch can be accepted. Both ad-
vantages are important in environmental management because
ecosystemvaluation is typically uncertain and data are often scarce.
If the aggregation parameters at higher levels are not changed, this
does not lead to biased results (with higherweight of the redundant
sub-objectives) irrespective of data availability. However, minimum
data requirements must be deﬁned to keep the assessment reliable.
In river management, this technique is particularly useful for the
branch of the objectives hierarchy that assesses the ecological state.
Here, different assessments of similar aspects of the ecological state
can be included and if data availability allows, their results can beaveraged to increase the conﬁdence (see Langhans et al., 2013 for an
example regarding the morphological state of a river section).
4.3.4. Accounting for uncertainty in elicited preferences
Due to the imprecision of the preferences of individual people
and of the elicitation process, utility functions are uncertain. When
merging individual utility functions into intersubjective utility
functions that represent the preferences of a group or the popu-
lation, differences between individual utility functions also
contribute to the uncertainty of the aggregated utility. This uncer-
tainty is not considered in expected utility theory, but it can be
relevant. Therefore, it may beworthwhile to analyze the robustness
of results to changes of preference parameters with scenario ana-
lyses (Schuwirth et al., 2012; Scholten et al., 2014a,b) and to
perform sensitivity analyses of the resulting ranking to the pa-
rameters of the utility function (Scholten et al., 2014b).
4.4. Deﬁcit analysis and generation of alternatives
If the value function is applied to the current state of the system,
deﬁcits can be identiﬁed. This can stimulate the creation of alter-
natives. Visualization of the fulﬁllment of all (sub-)objectives of the
objectives hierarchy can facilitate the identiﬁcation of deﬁcits
(Reichert et al., 2013). Including stakeholders may be important to
increase the creativity of the process. Their power of judgment
(Klauer et al., 2013) can be important to generate reasonable
alternatives.
In river management, deﬁcits are mainly identiﬁed by analyzing
the ecological objectives that may have been derived from
ecological assessment procedures (Langhans et al., 2013).
4.5. Predicting outcomes
A crucial element for any decision support methodology is the
prediction of the consequences of the alternatives. This can be done
by
 transferring knowledge from similar systems,
 eliciting expert opinions about effects of alternatives,
 applying mathematical models (elements of which may also
have been elicited from experts).
Predictions of outcomes can be visualized analogously as the
current state (Reichert et al., 2013). Probability network models can
be useful for aggregating information from more detailed, mecha-
nistic models, data analyses, the literature, and experts, while
considering uncertainty (Reckhow, 1999; Borsuk et al., 2004;
Reichert et al., 2007).
In river management, using expert advice has a long tradition.
Often experts were asked to select an alternative. However, this
confounds their prediction with their preferences. To avoid this
problem, we strongly recommend to get their predictions for the
outcomes and include them in the formal valuation process. This
has the additional advantage to learn from the comparison of
observed and predicted outcomes to improve future predictions.
4.6. Analyzing results and generating new alternatives
It is important to beneﬁt from insights of the decision support
procedure (Fig. 2) to improve aspects of alternatives or create new
alternatives. Separate evaluation for different stakeholder groups
helps identifying reasons for different ranks of alternatives for
different stakeholders.
In river management, initial value functions can be constructed
based on preference information from governmental authorities
good ecol. state reach
good morphological state
natural nutrient conc.
good ecol. state network
good mean state
natural fish migration
good habitat connectivity
Fig. 6. Simpliﬁed objectives hierarchy for assessing the ecological quality of a river
reach (simpliﬁed from Fig. 4).
P. Reichert et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 154 (2015) 316e332326involved in river management. A ﬁrst iteration of the decision
support procedure (Fig. 2) can be based on these value functions. In
a second iteration, values from stakeholders can be considered. The
reasons for different rankings of stakeholder groups can then be
analyzed to construct better alternatives (Hostmann et al., 2005a).
4.7. Summary of techniques to facilitate the application of the
approach in practice
In summary, the application of the concepts suggested in the
Sections 2 and 3 can be facilitated through:
1. the structure shown in Fig. 2, which divides the decision
making process into clearly separated, transparent steps of
lower complexity;
2. the explicit discussion of societal values and their clear sep-
aration from scientiﬁc predictions to support constructive
interaction between decision makers and stakeholders;
3. the transparency of the approach that supports communica-
tion of the reasons for a decision to the public;
4. some extensions to generally applied methodologies, as the use
of generic value functions for parts of the objectives hierar-
chy, redundant and ﬂexible value functions, and the consid-
eration of uncertainty in value assessments, which make the
application of MAVT/MAUT more robust;
5. insights gained through the structured decision making process
and, particularly, the deﬁcit analysis, which stimulate the
process of generating new alternatives that can easily be
incorporated into the value assessment.
Thus, the proposed practical aspects make the suggested
methodology fulﬁll the requirements 3a, 3b and 3c formulated in
the introduction.
5. Illustrating example: river rehabilitation prioritization
We illustrate our methodology with an application to spatial
planning of river rehabilitation at the catchment scale. We follow
the structure introduced in Fig. 2. Note that the value functions
used for the network assessment in this example are still at a
preliminary stage. They serve for illustrating the methodology and
stimulating further development, rather than for quantitative de-
cision support at this stage of the project. All calculations and vi-
sualizations in this sections were done with the packages “utility”,
“ecoval” and “rivernet” of the software environment for statistical
computing and graphics R (http://www.r-project.org).
5.1. Problem deﬁnition
River rehabilitation is a global priority driven by the loss of
freshwater biodiversity and of services that humans receive fromgood management strat.
good ecol. sta
good ecosyste
low cos
Fig. 5. Simpliﬁed objectives hierarchy for a good river management stfreshwater ecosystems (Bates et al., 2008; Roni et al., 2008). The
importance of river rehabilitation was also recognized by recent
legislations, such as the Water Framework Directive (European
Commission, 2012) or the Swiss water protection law (G€oggel,
2012). The beneﬁts of rehabilitation projects regarding the
improved state of the ecosystem and the increase in the provision
of (other) ecosystem services must be traded-off against the costs
of rehabilitation, or, if a budget has already be assigned to reha-
bilitation projects, the ecological gain achieved with planned
rehabilitation measures has to be maximized for a given budget.
Both of these objectives require the valuation of the ecosystem
state at the catchment scale. This is challenging, because river
assessment programs, which quantify the ecological state, so far
focused on the river section scale only. In this example, we provide
a ﬁrst suggestion of how to evaluate the ecological gain, ecosystem
services, and costs at the catchment scale and how to support
ﬁnding a trade-off between these criteria. The goal is to screen
potential spatial arrangements of rehabilitation projects, while
detailed planning of local rehabilitation measures would be done
later based on more detailed local information. For this example,
we focus on the M€onchaltorfer Aa catchment (51 km2) in
Switzerland (see Langhans et al., 2014a).
5.2. Stakeholder analysis
In Switzerland, preliminary suggestions for rehabilitation stra-
tegies are usually made by regional water authorities. Only when
planning becomes more concrete, multiple stakeholders are
involved (e.g. governmental agencies, residents, local interest
groups, NGOs, etc.). This example represents a ﬁrst analysis that
aims at supporting regional and national authorities in prioritizing
rehabilitation projects that will subsequently enter the political
decision making process.
5.3. Formulation, structuring and quantiﬁcation of objectives
To account for data availability at the catchment scale, we
simplify the objectives hierarchies shown in Figs. 3 and 4te network
good mean state
natural fish migration
good habitat connectivity
m services high recreational value
ts low implementation costs
rategy at the catchment or regional scale (simpliﬁed from Fig. 3).
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jectives hierarchy that are most important for the prioritization or
are most strongly affected by rehabilitation (Figs. 5 and 6).
To formulate the “good river management strategy” we include
the three branches “good ecological state of a river network”, “good
ecosystem services” and “low costs” from Fig. 3 at the highest level
of the objectives hierarchy (Fig. 5). We only consider alternatives
that conform to regulation and all considered alternatives are
similar regarding robustness to later adaptations; therefore, we can
omit those two branches. We limit the lower level of the branch
“good ecosystem services to “high recreational value” which is the
service most strongly affected in our study catchment (note, how-
ever, that other ecosystem services may be more strongly affected
in other catchments). We limit the branch “low costs” to “low
implementation costs” assuming the maintenance costs to be
similar before and after rehabilitation.
To make the sub-objective of a “good ecological state at the river
network scale” more concrete, we divide it into the three sub-
objectives “good mean ecological state of river sections”, “natural
potential for ﬁsh migration”, and “good habitat connectivity” (see
Figs. 3 and 5). The ﬁrst of these expresses the objective of having as
many reaches in a good state as possible irrespective of their spatial
arrangement. The second emphasizes the importance of ﬁsh as an
integrative indicator of ecosystem health. Finally, the third sub-
objective favors long river corridors in a good state to increase
biodiversity and resilience (see more extensive discussion in Sec-
tions S1 and S2 of the supporting information).
To assess the ecological state of the river sections, we consider
the branches “good morphological state” and “natural nutrient
concentrations” from themore comprehensive objectives hierarchy
in Fig. 4 (Fig. 6).Whilewe do not expect the nutrient concentrations
to signiﬁcantly change due to rehabilitation measures at small and
intermediate spatial scales, the nutrient state serves as a rough
estimate of the chemical state. Consideration of the chemical state
is important as a poor chemical state may hinder the biological
success of rehabilitation. It would be desirable to directly consider
the biological state as well. However, predicting biological effects at
the catchment scale is much more difﬁcult than the morphological
state and nutrient levels; we therefore use these as proxies.
Value functions for the ecological state at the river reach level
(in our case based on the assessment of themorphological state and
nutrient levels, see Fig. 6), were constructed by converting the
procedures of the Swiss concept for stream assessment (Bundi
et al., 2000; Hütte and Niederhauser, 1998; Liechti, 2010; http://
www.modul-stufen-konzept.ch) into value functions (Langhans
et al., 2013). We aggregated the value functions for the morpho-
logical state and nutrients by the additive-minimum aggregation
shown in the rightmost panel of Fig. 1 (see also discussion in
Langhans et al., 2014a).
There are no similar assessments available for the ecological
state at the river network level. Therefore, we suggest preliminary
value functions at this level and hope that this stimulates a broader
discussion of this topic. To formulate the degrees of fulﬁllment of
the sub-objectives “good mean ecological state of river sections”,
“natural potential for ﬁsh migration”, and “good habitat connec-
tivity” we ﬁrst have to ﬁnd reasonable attributes. We suggest the
attributes “meanval” (length- and stream order-weighted mean of
the ecological value of the river sections), “fractmig” (fraction of
reachable headwaters for ﬁsh of those which would be reachable
without artiﬁcial barriers), and “fractconn” (sum of total length of
adjacent reaches in good ecological state weighted by the inverse of
their rank regarding this length) (see section S1 in the supporting
information for details). We then formulated preliminary value
functions for the sub-objectives assessed by these attributes and
aggregated them again with the additive-minimum aggregationtechnique (for two values illustrated in the rightmost panel of
Fig. 1; see also Langhans et al., 2014a) (see Section S2 in the
supporting information).
The degree of fulﬁllment of the objective of a “high recreational
value” was formulated as a function of the attribute “fractgood-
morph” (fraction of river length in good morphological state) (see
Section S2 in the supporting information for more details). This is
again a very crude approach used to illustrate our concepts. Re-
ﬁnements would be necessary, particularly if this approach is
applied to larger catchments.
Finally, we assumed a linear value function for costs and additive
aggregation at the highest level of sub-objectives in the objectives
hierarchy shown in Fig. 5. Additive aggregation seems appropriate at
this level to represent the trade-off between costs and improved
ecosystem state and (other) services. The range of the value function
for costs and theweights of the additive aggregationwere estimated
from the legislation process stimulated by a public initiative (see
Supporting information for details). To account for the high uncer-
tainty in this willingness-to-pay estimate, we considered uncer-
tainty of the weight of costs by a factor of 2 (with a uniform
distribution) and renormalized the weights to unity.
5.4. Identiﬁcation of deﬁcits
Morphological data are available for the entire catchment. As
shown in Fig. 7, a major part of the river network is not in a good
morphological state. Additionally, a considerable number of artiﬁ-
cial and natural barriers (> 50 cm) prevent brown trout migration
to upstream river sections (Fig. 7).
Water quality data are only available at 10 sites. We used these
to estimate nutrient pollution using the area fractions of intensive
agricultural land use and the amount of treated waste water dis-
charged per area of the sub-catchment as explanatory variables. As
this ﬁt had a quite good predictive capability at these 10 sites (see
Fig. S2 in the supporting information), and the explanatory vari-
ables are available for the entire catchment, this linear regression
model could be used to extrapolate the state of nutrient pollution to
the catchment. The results indicate that large parts of the river
network are in moderate to bad conditions (Fig. 8).
5.5. Construction of alternatives
The decision support framework illustrated in this example can
be used for an automatic screening of a large number of rehabili-
tation alternatives. Such sets of alternatives could be generated and
evaluated automatically by an optimization algorithm. However,
for this example, we demonstrate the use of the procedure by
comparing only eight manually suggested rehabilitation alterna-
tives. Each alternative is deﬁned by the reaches to be rehabilitated,
the barriers to be removed, and the maximum fraction of intensive
agricultural land use allowed in all sub-catchments. River sections
with trafﬁc infrastructure, buildings, or groundwater protection
zones within a range of 15 m from the river at both banks were
excluded from alternatives to avoid extremely high costs and
conﬂicts with legislation. This made it possible to use a universal
cost estimate per river length throughout the catchment. The def-
icits identiﬁed from Figs. 7 and 8 motivated a comparison of the
following alternatives to discuss complementary rehabilitation
strategies:
Alt 1 Keep the current state.
Alt 2 Open and rehabilitate all culverts.
Alt 3 Rehabilitate river morphology of a main branch with no
natural barriers and remove the artiﬁcial barriers (e.g.
replace them by bed ramps that can be passed by ﬁsh).
Morphological State very good
good
moderate
unsatisfactory
bad
culvert
artif. barrier
nat. barrier
Fig. 7. Morphological state of the river sections in the M€onchaltorfer Aa catchment.
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intensive agriculture to a maximum of 40% for all sub-
catchments.
Alt 5 Rehabilitate the morphology of reaches which form gaps in a
branch which already has many reaches in a good morpho-
logical state.
Alt 6 Rehabilitate the morphology of a tributary with few natural
barriers and remove artiﬁcial barriers.
Alt 7 Combine measures from alternatives 4, 5 and 6.
Alt 8 Rehabilitate approximately the same river length and
remove the same number of artiﬁcial barriers as in alterna-
tive 7, but choose the reaches and barriers randomly.
Note that alternatives 2e7 illustrate alternative management
strategies, whereas alternative 1 is used to compare the other al-
ternatives with the current state. Comparing alternatives 7 and 8
illustrates the different effects of strategic or random selections of
rehabilitation activities. The alternatives are explained and visual-
ized in Section S5 in the supporting information.Fig. 8. Extrapolated state regarding nutrient pollution of the river sections in5.6. Prediction of consequences
For morphologically rehabilitated river sections at sites without
rehabilitation constraints within 15m (see Section 5.5) we assumed
50% probability for the best and 50% probability for the second best
level of discrete attributes and uniform distributions from 10 to
15 m for the riparian zone width. For sections with rehabilitation
constraints on one side, we assumed uniform distributions from 2
to 5 m for the riparian zone width at the constrained side of the
river. For barriers, we assumed that they were removed or replaced
by a construction that can be passed by ﬁsh, e.g. a bed ramp with
large blocks. If not otherwise mentioned, agricultural land use and
thus water quality remained the same as in the current state. For
alternatives 4, 7 and 8 in which land use by intensive agriculture
was limited to 40%, current land use fractions were modiﬁed
accordingly. In both cases, water quality valuation and its uncer-
tainty was predicted based on the linear regression model
considering parameter and residual uncertainty. Median costs were
estimated to be CHF 20000 per m of morphologically rehabilitatedthe M€onchaltorfer Aa catchment. Black dots represent observation sites.
Fig. 9. Valuation of rehabilitation alternatives for all relevant nodes of the objectives hierarchy (Fig. 5). The black lines in the boxes refer to the median values of probabilistic
predictions plotted on a scale from 0 to 1 on the lower boundary of the boxes. The colored range represents the 5e95% quantile range using colors that are commonly used for
ecological quality classes (see legend in the top left corner). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
P. Reichert et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 154 (2015) 316e332 329river (Langhans et al., 2014b) and CHF 1000000 per replacement of
an artiﬁcial barrier by a bed ramp (Berner, 2006). We used normal
distributions with standard deviations of 33% around these esti-
mates to account for uncertainty. We did not account for costs for
the reduction of intensive agriculture, as we assumed that farmers
can earn a similar salary by organic farming.
5.7. Evaluation of alternatives based on expected degree of
achievement of objectives
Fig. 9 shows the predicted value distributions of the relevant
nodes of the objectives hierarchy shown in Fig. 5 for all decision
alternatives.
5.8. Analysis of results
Removing culverts (Alt. 2) or choosing rehabilitation sections
randomly (Alt. 8) leads to a considerably smaller gain in the
ecological state of the river network than a strategic choice of
sections and nodes (Alt. 7) at similar costs (Fig. 9). The importance
of integrative planning is demonstrated by the comparison of
rehabilitation of a main branch with and without accompanying
water quality improvements (Alt. 3 and 4). It is remarkable, that the
signiﬁcant differences in the valuation of outcomes at lower levels
of the objectives hierarchy are strongly decreased at the highest
level. This is a consequence of two mechanisms: First, cheaper al-
ternatives tend to have less effect (but see the importance of a
strategic choice of rehabilitation sites discussed above). Second, the
high uncertainty about willingness to pay for river rehabilitation
tends to make still existing differences less signiﬁcant. Only two
alternatives, 4 and 7, lead with some conﬁdence to a good ecolog-
ical state of the river network (green values). Of these two, 7 is more
expensive, but leads to better results in particular regarding con-
nected habitats. Given these results, further steps would be to ac-
quire more local information at the rehabilitation sites of these
alternatives and try to ﬁnd better alternatives starting with modi-
ﬁcations of these two alternatives. This process could be stimulated
by the detailed geographical outline of the alternatives and their
consequences as shown in Section S5 in the supporting
information.6. Summary and conclusions
We argue for combining probability theory and scenario plan-
ning with multi-attribute utility theory as a conceptual framework
for environmental decision support. We discuss the need for ad-
aptations, extensions, and didactical support of these theories to
improve their applicability in environmental management. This
partially accounts for weak points criticized by developers and
users of alternative approaches.
In the following sub-sections we brieﬂy summarize the most
important suggested adaptations and extensions and conclude
with ﬁnal comments.
6.1. Intersubjective probabilities
Depending on the context, knowledge may be described by
objective or subjective probabilities. In decision making for envi-
ronmental management, probabilities should represent the state of
knowledge of the scientiﬁc community about outcomes of decision
alternatives. We argue that intersubjective probabilities (Gillies,
1991, 2000) provide the best framework for this purpose. This is
rarely discussed explicitly, although combinations of probability
statements of multiple experts are often used for scientiﬁc pre-
diction, and multiple opinions in peer review processes are the
basis of scientiﬁc quality control.
6.2. Imprecise probabilities
Although there are convincing arguments for using (inter-
subjective) probabilities to describe scientiﬁc knowledge, the
limited capability of experts to quantify these probabilities and
disagreements between experts can call for an extension to
imprecise probabilities. The degree of imprecision can then be
used to quantify the transition from cases in which quantitative
decision support is suitable to cases in which the knowledge is
insufﬁcient (e.g. Rinderknecht et al., 2012b). In the latter case,
other criteria, such as the precautionary principle or probability
distributions of the predicted change instead of absolute pre-
dictions (Reichert and Borsuk, 2005) may be used to support
decisions.
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In some cases, due to too large ambiguity, scientists may even
hesitate to formulate their predictions as imprecise probabilities.
Here, it may be useful to combine alternative future scenarios with
conditional probabilistic predictions and search for decision alter-
natives that are robust regarding the scenarios.
6.4. Emphasis on value functions (rather than utilities)
Although utility and not value functions are the basis for rational
decision support under risk (based on probabilistic predictions of
outcomes of decision alternatives), we emphasize the importance
of value functions. Eliciting values and transforming them to utili-
ties only at high hierarchical levels (Dyer and Sarin, 1982) has
several advantages compared to eliciting utilities directly
throughout the objectives hierarchy: (i) elicitation of a hierarchical,
multi-attribute value function is easier than of a utility function
(because preference elicitation can be done with outcomes instead
of lotteries of outcomes); (ii) this avoids confounding the strength
of preference for outcomes with risk attitudes (Dyer and Sarin,
1982) and makes it possible to analyze the degree of fulﬁllment
of (sub-)objectives to stimulate the improvement of alternatives;
(iii) the probability distribution of values can already give relevant
insights into the decision problem under risk, even if ﬁnally utilities
are required to generate the ranking of alternatives; (iv) if the
ranking of alternatives does not change in a sensitivity analysis that
includes strong risk attitudes, utilities do not even have to be
elicited.
6.5. Importance of the value aggregation scheme
More attention should be given to the elicitation of the aggre-
gation scheme, instead of assuming additivity when calculating the
degree of fulﬁllment of an objective based on the degrees of
fulﬁllment of its sub-objectives. Particularly in ecological valua-
tions, the importance of the joint fulﬁllment of goals regarding
complementary aspects of an ecosystem leads to the need for non-
additive aggregation (Langhans et al., 2014a).
6.6. Redundancy of sub-objectives and allowing for ﬂexibility in
data availability
Contrary to standard decision theory, we argue that redundancy
of sub-objectives can be an advantage for ecosystem assessment. As
long as aggregation schemes at higher hierarchical levels are not
changed, redundant sub-branches do not bias the overall assess-
ment but increase conﬁdence in the assessments and ﬂexibility in
data availability. Additive aggregation seems appropriate for this
case.
6.7. Combination of value functions elicited from different groups
An important sub-objective in environmental management is to
achieve a good state of an ecosystem affected by management al-
ternatives. Quantifying the degree of fulﬁllment of this objective as
a function of (typically many and partly technical) attributes is
difﬁcult for laypersons. Therefore, it may be useful to elicit this
branch of the value function from experts or to construct it based
on existing ecological assessment procedures. It may even be
possible to achieve a certain universality of such assessments
among ecosystems of the same type so that a generic value function
can be applied across similar systems. When relying on expert
value functions, it is important to explain and visualize the mean-
ing of these values to allow the stakeholders to formulate theiraggregation rules at higher hierarchical levels.
6.8. Consideration of uncertainty in preference representation
The elicitation of preferences from individuals is affected by
imprecision of the elicitation procedure and, potentially, by
imprecision of the person's preferences. If value functions of several
individuals are merged into a single, intersubjective value function,
differences between the aggregated functions can even increase
imprecision. This imprecision is not accounted for in “standard”
expected utility theory. Unless this imprecision is small, it may be
important to do a sensitivity analysis of the resulting ranking of
alternatives (Scholten et al., 2014a,b).
6.9. Final comments
Many of the ideas summarized in the sections 6.1e6.8 could be
illustrated with the example of river rehabilitation prioritization in
a small catchment in Switzerland. This is in particular the case for
the formulation of uncertain knowledge with probabilities, value
functions and their aggregation, combination of expert and societal
value functions, and uncertainty regarding preference representa-
tion. This illustrative example also demonstrated the need for
assessing river ecosystems at larger spatial scales than this has
typically been done in the past.
In this paper, we emphasized the importance of a solid con-
ceptual foundation of a decision support methodology for envi-
ronmental management. This is a crucial aspect to guide the
transfer of scientiﬁc knowledge into societal decision making.
However, the practical implementation is another key element of
successful decision support. A well-structured decision support
procedure, high transparency by a good didactical presentation of
scientiﬁc results and elicited values, and a good facilitation of the
discussion among scientists, stakeholders, and decision makers are
important aspects of practical implementation. In our view,
combining a conceptually satisfying decision support procedure as
outlined in this paper with a careful implementation can contribute
signiﬁcantly to societal decision making, However, it has also to be
kept in mind that such quantitative analyses are always incomplete
and only cover “technocratic” aspects of the decision problems. For
this reason, it is essential to see them as tools to support and not
replace appropriate evaluations by specialists and negotiations at
the political level.
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